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I think the courts should give the tenants an option to
tell their story. A lot of people get in those situations;
you don't know how they got there. I don't think
people are just sitting around not paying rent just to
not be paying rent, you know?1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our nation faces a serious eviction epidemic. More than 2.3
million eviction actions are filed every year.2 That equates to about
four per minute.3 The eviction crisis is a multi-faceted problem that
will require a systemic, interdisciplinary approach. Studies have
found “a complex combination of financial, social, relational and
health factors contributes to the inability to pay rent.”4 The causes
of the crisis include, among other things, poverty, increasing rents,
decreasing wages, and vanishing affordable housing.5 Evictions not
2. While there is no centralized data collection about eviction rates, the
Eviction Lab at Princeton University estimates that millions of families are
evicted every year. The Eviction Lab has developed a database to assist
policymakers in understanding the scope of the problem. National Estimates:
Evictions in America, THE EVICTION LAB (May 11, 2018),
https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates/. See also Terry Gross, First-Ever
Evictions Database Shows: “We’re in the Middle of a Housing Crisis,” NAT’L
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Apr.
12,
2018,
1:07
PM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evictions-databaseshows-were-in-the-middle-of-a-housing-crisis.
3. THE EVICTION LAB, supra note 2.
4. Marleke Holl et al., Interventions to Prevent Tenant Evictions: A
Systematic Review, 24 HEALTH & SOC. CARE COMMUNITY 532, 533 (2016).
5. Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Who Gets Evicted? Assessing
Individual, Neighborhood, and Network Factors, 62 SOC. SCI. RES. 362 (2017).
Most of the families pushed out of their homes due to poverty include children,
and Black mothers are disproportionately impacted. MATTHEW DESMOND,
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, POL’Y RES. BRIEF, POOR BLACK WOMEN ARE
EVICTED AT ALARMING RATES, SETTING OFF A CHAIN OF HARDSHIP 2 (2014),
https://www.macfound.org/media/files/HHM_Research_Brief_Poor_Black_Wo
men_Are_Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf. A Baltimore study of three hundred
renters who came to Rent Court revealed the following statistics: 79% identified
as women; 94% as African American/Black; 60% reported a household size of
two to four persons and 65% housed at least one minor child in the rented unit.
PUB. JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE DIVERTED: HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE
BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 12 (2015) [hereinafter JUSTICE DIVERTED].

2020 Symposium]

Eisenberg & Ebner

127

only result from poverty,6 they exacerbate poverty.7 Evictions are
traumatic experiences, especially for children, that can devastate
communities.8
This urgent problem is not new. Many decades ago, scholars and
tenant advocates sounded an alarm about the growing eviction
problem.9 Fast-forward to 2020, and the eviction epidemic persists,
as do the scathing criticisms of the legal process as an expedited
“housed-to-homeless pipeline.” 10 One study in Baltimore, for
example, described the city’s “rent court” as a “broken system” that
puts “long-standing tenant protections and basic housing standards
second to landlords’ bottom line.”11
Jurisdictions across the country are attacking the problem in
different ways. Some have increased legal protections for tenants.12
Recognizing that legal rights are meaningless unless asserted in
court, some cities now guarantee legal counsel for all tenants facing

6. According to the Eviction Lab, “most poor renting families spend at least
half of their income on housing costs, with one in four of those families spending
over 70 percent of their income just on rent and utilities.” Why Eviction Matters,
THE EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/why-eviction-matters/#affordablehousing-crisis (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
7. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE
AMERICAN CITY 296 (2016). As Matthew Desmond describes: “eviction does not
simply drop poor families into a dark valley, a trying yet relatively brief detour
on life’s journey. It fundamentally redirects their way, casting them onto a
different, and much more difficult, path. Eviction is a cause, not just a condition,
of poverty.” Id. at 298-99. See also Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the
Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88 (2012).
8. DESMOND, supra note 7, at 298 (describing impact of evictions on
communities, including higher violent crime and lack of neighborhood
instability); Philip M.E. Garboden, Tama Leventhal& Sandra Newman,
Estimating the Effects of Residential Mobility: A Methodological Note, 43 J. SOC.
SERV. RES. 246 (2017); Holl et al., supra note 4, at 533.
9. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
533 (1992).
10. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 6.
11. Id.
12. Legal reforms include caps on the amount of rent or security deposits
that can be charged, limits on rental increases, and “just cause” eviction laws. See
Justice
Innovation,
STANFORD
LEGAL
DESIGN
LAB,
https://justiceinnovation.law.stanford.edu/resources/maps/eviction/#limit
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (summarizing legal limits on landlords).

128

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[41

eviction. 13 Others call for increased affordable housing or
recognition of housing as a basic human right.14
While these reforms are helpful, the ongoing eviction crisis
should teach us that traditional legal approaches alone are not likely
to make a meaningful difference. While some tenants have
cognizable legal defenses, others do not. For a variety of reasons,
they simply cannot afford to pay rent. In these cases, tenants may
need something that a judge cannot give them: additional time, a
payment plan, additional resources, or flexible options to keep them
housed.15
Some states have experimented with proactive eviction
prevention programs that combine mediation and problem-solving
processes with legal advice and other types of rental assistance.16
These programs connect tenants with available resources before
they fall behind on their rent, and facilitate ongoing communication
and conflict resolution between renters and property owners. In
addition to pre-filing interventions, some courts offer mediation
programs to help parties negotiate agreements to prevent eviction
and address housing issues.
This article explores the potential benefits and challenges of
using mediation and other conflict resolution approaches as part of
comprehensive plan to disrupt the eviction crisis. Although not a
panacea, early conflict interventions and mediation services may be
valuable components of a multi-faceted eviction prevention
strategy, especially when offered early—long before an eviction
filing—and integrated with legal advice and other supportive
services.

13. See Jared Brey, Is Tenants’ Right to Counsel on Its Way to Becoming a
Standard
Practice?,
NEXT
CITY
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/is-tenants-right-to-counsel-on-its-way-tobecoming-standard-practice (discussing right to counsel laws in New York City,
Cleveland, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Newark). The vast majority of
tenants appear without counsel in housing court, but studies have shown that legal
representation dramatically increases their chances of keeping their homes. D.
James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of
Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District
Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013); Carroll Seron
et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York
City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 419 (2001).
14. Lisa T. Alexander, Evicted: The Socio-Legal Case for the Right to
Housing, 126 YALE L.J. F. 431 (2017). The call for recognition of housing as a
basic human right finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
see G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being of himself
and his family, including . . . housing.”).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Parts III and IV.
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II. MEDIATION IN THE “RENT COURT”
The legal procedure for evictions, known as summary ejectment
or unlawful detainer, has been criticized as an expedited, statesanctioned collection process for landlords in which tenants are
voiceless and powerless. 17 Eviction cases typically proceed on a
rapid timeline—much faster than other civil cases. 18 In many
jurisdictions, hearings occur in about a week’s time, leaving little to
no opportunity for tenants to seek legal advice or rental assistance,
or even file a written defense to the action.19 An eviction docket can
include hundreds or even thousands of cases a day.20 Although the
majority of tenants do not appear, 21 the courtroom typically is
crowded and chaotic.22
The legal issue in an eviction proceeding is repossession of the
property due to the failure to pay rent. Most tenants lack awareness
of their legal rights and do not have an attorney. Self-represented
tenants who have cognizable legal defenses to an eviction may be
afraid to raise them in the intimidating atmosphere of a courtroom.23
Even if they speak up, studies have found that tenants who attempt
to tell their stories about substandard housing conditions or

17. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at vi; Bezdek, supra note 9, at 565. See
also Rebecca Gale, Why Landlords File for Eviction (Hint: It’s Usually Not to
Evict),
CITY
LAB
(June
18,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/06/eviction-notice-process-rentallandlords-collect-late-rent/591553/ (“[F]iling for eviction turns tenants into
chastened debtors, giving landlords additional leverage to deter them from
complaining about a code violation or mistreatment. In courts, late rent takes
precedence over unmade repairs and other issues.”).
18. See generally Megan E. Hatch, Statutory Protection for Renters:
Classification of State Landlord-Tenant Policy Approaches, 27 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 98 (2017) (providing a review and taxonomy of various state and local
legal approaches to the landlord-tenant relationship); Eviction Process by State:
A 50-Stater Nationwide Overview, VERTICAL RENT (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.verticalrent.com/entry/eviction-process-by-state-a-50-staternationwide-overview.
19. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 5-7 (describing Baltimore’s rapid
timeline for summary ejectment, in which tenants are served with process in two
to four days and trial occurs within five to ten days).
20. Id. at 46-47 (showing that in Baltimore City, for example, a daily failureto-pay rent docket usually includes a shocking 1,000 cases).
21. DESMOND, supra note 7, at 96 (describing the default rate in eviction
actions across various states and cities ranges from 35% to more than 90%); see
also Randy Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process
a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV.
759 (1994); see also Erick Larson, Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant
Default in a Housing Court, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2006).
22. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 21 (describing that participants in
rent court characterize process as “chaotic”); see also DESMOND, supra note 7, at
95-99 (describing eviction court at a Milwaukee county courthouse).
23. Bezdek, supra note 9, at 560-61.
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temporary financial hardships are effectively silenced by the court.24
No matter how empathetic judges may be to the tenant’s
circumstances on a human level, the reason the tenant cannot pay
the rent often has no legal consequence. In most cases, the judge
asks whether the tenant agrees that the rent is due and unpaid. 25
Many tenants respond “yes, but . . . ” At that point, the court
typically interrupts the tenant and takes but a few minutes26 to sign
an eviction order, putting the tenant on a path to homelessness.27
It is questionable whether an ethically sound and quality
mediation process can, and more importantly should,28 be integrated
into a legal process widely criticized as broken, unjust, and prolandlord. Mediation may have little efficacy when tenants face such
grave consequences and have limited financial and housing options.
Providing mediation when the tenant is on the brink of homelessness
and lacks legal counsel is fraught with fairness concerns and process
dangers. 29 In addition, the landlord’s investment in the eviction
process, and high likelihood of prevailing in court, diminishes their
flexibility in last-minute negotiations.
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, day-of-trial mediation may
help some tenants avoid eviction and obtain other benefits,
especially as compared to outcomes of summary ejectment
adjudication. As described below, mediation may help tenants reach
agreements that include flexible payment plans, reductions in the
amount owed, specific timelines for repairs, a delayed move out
date, or additional time to find new housing. Mediation also helps
tenants to avoid an eviction judgment on their record that could
affect future rental opportunities.
Likewise, mediation may allow property owners to avoid the
hassle and expense involved with court filings and tenant turnover.30
24. Id. at 586-90; see also JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 29 (noting
that “rent court” judges discouraged tenants from raising “any issue other than
whether they had paid the specific amount of money the landlord alleged was
owed”).
25. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 34.
26. Bezdek, supra note 9, at 586.
27. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(e) (2019) (noting that
after a judgment, many jurisdictions allow tenants to “redeem” the property by
paying the rent owed, plus additional court costs and fees, to prevent an eviction).
28. See Noam Ebner & Sharon Press, Eviction Mediation: An International
Conversation Followed by Five More, 41 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y &
PRAC., Symposium Issue No. 3 (2019) (discussing the wisdom of involving
mediation in these proceedings, given inherent ethical challenges as well as the
concern that mediation activity might allow courts or legislatures to avoid the
need to make systemic change).
29. Id.
30. See Casey Schwab, Landlord Tenant Mediation: A Modern Approach to
Tenant
Issues,
AVAIL
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://www.avail.co/education/articles/landlord-tenant-mediation-a-modern-
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Although often portrayed as the villain in this story, most landlords
do not want to be perceived as the “bad guy.” 31 Even property
owners who sympathize with a tenant’s financial predicament and
comply with all housing standards simply cannot sustain a business
when unpaid rent accrues. Some landlords attempt to work with
tenants who experience sudden financial hardship and delay filing
for eviction as long as possible.32
While larger property management companies can build
eviction expenses into their business models, the eviction process
can be especially burdensome and costly for smaller “mom-andpop” landlords who operate rent-check-to-mortgage-payment.33 To
pursue an eviction action, landlords must pay a case filing fee,
potentially hire an attorney, and incur additional fees for the actual
eviction. The landlord then must prepare the property for a new
renter and advertise for a new tenant. Given these costs, some
landlords go so far as to pay tenants simply to leave the premises
and return the keys without paying the rent, known as “cash for
keys.”34
Given these dynamics, there may be a window of opportunity
for day-of-trial mediation in the eviction context, particularly in
cases involving smaller landlords who have a longer relationship
with a particular tenant. As described below, the benefits may
include a greater sense of voice, broader remedial options, and
increased flexibility.

approach-to-tenant-issues (describing potential benefits of mediation for
landlords). But see JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that compared
to other types of civil small claims litigation, however, summary ejectment cases
are less burdensome, with lower filing fees, expedited timelines, and other
advantages for the landlord. This ease of filing may be one of the reasons that
summary ejectment cases are the single largest type of case on the court dockets
in many states).
31. See Bert Stratton, Opinion, I’m Not Evil. I’m a Landlord, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/opinion/im-not-evil-ima-landlord.html.
32. DESMOND, supra note 7, at 38-39 (describing landlord who worked with
tenants and did not evict most tenants who owed back rent).
33. See Pam Fessler, Low-Income Renters Squeezed Between Too-High
Rents and Subpar Housing, NAT’L PUB. RADIO MORNING EDITION (Mar. 30,
2016),
https://www.npr.org/2016/03/30/471347546/low-income-renterssqueezed-between-too-high-rents-and-subpar-housing (quoting landlords who
say they need the rent to pay for mortgage, tax bills, and repairs).
34. See
LEWIS,
supra
note
1,
at
Findings:
Landlords,
http://evictions.cura.umn.edu/news/findings-landlords (describing “cash for
keys”).
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A. Voice
Having a sense of voice—or opportunity to tell one’s story—has
been found to be a vital component of procedural justice.35 Studies
have found that tenants lack a sense of voice in the eviction legal
process, which focuses predominantly on the landlord’s claim for
unpaid rent and discourages defenses by the tenant.36 As described
by one tenant:
The only question they [judges in eviction cases] ask
you is, “So you agree with the amount that’s owed?”
Like they don’t, you know, take the time to get your
side of the story or to see. . . why you haven’t paid
anything, or if there’s anything wrong with the
property.37
In her study of the many ways that the eviction process silences
tenants, Professor Barbara Bezdek observed that judges frequently
ask tenants, “Is there anything else you wish to tell me?” Tenants
typically respond with “a human story which is not given legal
credence.” 38 When tenants attempt to explain the reasons for
nonpayment of rent, “[t]he judge either waits through the story or
interrupts it, but at either point, tells the tenant that her remarks are
irrelevant, and orders judgment for the landlord.” 39 Professor
Bezdek characterized the court’s silencing of tenant’s personal
stories as the result of a “rule-oriented” rather than “relationoriented” account of disputes.40
Unlike the expedited, inflexible court proceeding, mediation
offers a relational, problem-solving process. One of the most
important benefits of mediation as compared to adjudication is the
opportunity for parties to tell their stories directly to the mediator
and the opposing side. Unlike judges, who must rule based solely on
35. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice:
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) (finding that “voice with the
possibility of influence . . . leads to even greater perceived fairness”); Tom R.
Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985)
(finding voice heightens perception of procedural justice). See also Nancy A.
Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural
and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004).
36. See supra notes 5 and 9 and accompanying text.
37. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 34.
38. Bezdek, supra note 9, at 586.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 586-87 (citing John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules Versus
Relationships in Small Claims Disputes, in CONFLICT TALK: SOCIOLINGUISTIC
INVESTIGATIONS OF ARGUMENTS IN CONVERSATIONS 178 (Allen D. Grimshaw
ed., 1990)).
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evidence relevant to the legal claims at issue (i.e., the failure to pay
rent), under most mediation frameworks practiced in small claims
court, the mediators attempt to identify all issues that are important
to all parties. 41 While relational issues tend to be irrelevant in a
courtroom, they often constitute the heart and soul of the
conversation in a mediation session. Lon Fuller described this as
mediation’s “capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not
by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.”42
Studies of civil small claims mediation programs generally have
found positive outcomes for the parties.43 Research in the eviction
mediation context is more limited, but likewise finds benefits. For
example, a review of an ADR pilot program in the Baltimore City
rent division found that both tenants and landlords reported a
generally positive view of the experience on post-mediation
evaluations.44 The vast majority of participants reported that they
felt heard by the other side (83%);45 had enough time to say what
they wanted to say (92%);46 discussed all of the issues that brought

41. As Craig McEwen and Richard Maiman describe, mediation is based on
principles of participation and consent. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman,
Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237
(1981). The mediator “encourages the parties to find a mutually agreeable
settlement by helping them to sharpen the issues, reduce misunderstandings,
establish priorities, vent emotions, find points of agreement, and ultimately,
negotiate an agreement.” Id. at 238.
42. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305, 325 (1971).
43. See Lorig Charkoudian, Deborah Thompson Eisenberg & Jamie L.
Walter, What Difference Does ADR Make? Comparison of ADR and Trial
Outcomes in Small Claims Court, 35 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 7 (2017) (finding that
parties who participated in ADR reported significant immediate and long-term
benefits as compared to parties who proceeded to trial without ADR, including:
improved party attitudes and relationship with each other; increased sense of
empowerment and voice; increased likelihood of parties taking responsibility for
the dispute; increased party satisfaction with the judiciary; and decreased
predicted probability of returning to court in next year); Roselle L. Wissler,
Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process
and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323 (1995).
44. CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, UNIV. OF MARYLAND FRANCIS KING
CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW (C-DRUM), REPORT ON THE 2016 RENT COURT ADR
PILOT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND IN BALTIMORE CITY (2017),
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&c
ontext=cdrum_fac_pubs.
45. Id. at 32-33.
46. Id. at 27-28. Out of 55 respondents, 50 agreed or strongly agreed that
they had enough time to say what they wanted to say (92%), with nearly half
(47%) strongly agreeing.
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them to court (88%);47 did not feel pressured to reach an agreement
(81%); 48 would recommend the ADR process to others (86%); 49
were satisfied with the mediation (89%);50 and were glad that ADR
services are available (85%).51
The narrative comments that parties shared on their evaluations
during the rent court ADR pilot confirmed the sense of voice
evidenced in the data above. They included, for example:
● This was a very easy process, it allowed me to speak with
the other party in a relaxed setting[.]
● Both parties can speak.
● I learn’t about the tennant’s circumstances and
resources available to help [.]
● Calming effect on parties to discuss all issues[.]
● Sitting at a table sometimes puts people at ease
● It was helpful to have a neutral third party hear our case.
● [I]t was good to be able to express differences in a
controlled environment[.]
● It’s helpful to get people to open up and work things
out[.]
● It’s a more compassionate way to settle differences[.]52
During the ADR pilot, 81% of the cases referred to mediation
reached an agreement.53 Eighty-five percent of respondents agreed
that the agreement met their needs.54 Although mediation programs
should not be evaluated based on settlement rates alone, the
Maryland District Court ADR Program reports that failure-to-pay
rent cases have the second highest settlement rate in mediation of all
civil cases mediated in the statewide ADR program.55
While mediation may provide a sense of voice to some parties,
this may not, on its own, warrant the establishment of eviction
mediation programs. This would reinforce the perception some have
of mediation as a “feel good” process that does not deliver bottom47. Id. at 28-29. The vast majority of participants, 88% (47), “agreed” or
“strongly agreed” with the statement: “We discussed all the issues that brought us
here.” Id. at 29. There were five participants, however, who strongly disagreed
with that statement. Id.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Id. at 31-32.
51. Id. at 34.
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Thirty out of thirty-seven mediated cases reached agreement, twentythree of which were “full” agreements and seven were “partial” agreements. Id.
at 5.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Mediation in the Rent Court, DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND,
https://mdcourts.gov/district/adr/home/rentcourt (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
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line benefits. Therefore, we must consider the fundamental question
of whether mediation leads to positive outcomes for the parties, as
well as the valid concern that tenants face the risk of exploitation in
the mediation process.56
B. Day-of-Trial Eviction Mediation Programs
While research is limited, day-of-trial eviction mediation
programs have been associated with positive outcomes. A study of
a non-profit mediation program in Boston summary process cases
found that mediation resulted in better overall results for tenants as
compared to either court adjudication or a “hallway deal” with the
landlord or its agent.57 Notably, while adjudication always resulted
in an eviction order, mediation averted this outcome in some cases.58
While tenants lost all counterclaims asserted in the adjudicated
cases, landlords agreed to reduce or waive rent in 10.8% of mediated
cases due to housing conditions, and forgave or reduced back rent if
the tenant moved out by a certain date. 59 Mediated agreements
included other terms that could not be awarded by the court, such as
positive references for future housing.60
A study of a mediation program conducted by a grassroots antipoverty housing program in Northampton, Massachusetts likewise
found that on the whole tenants fared considerably better in
mediation than they did in court or informal settlements without
mediation. The mediated agreements included payment plans in
more than half of the mediated cases (58.8%), processes to maintain
56. For articles about the potential risks of mediation for marginalized
parties, see, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359;
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991).
57. Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law:
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation,
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 97-98.
58. While the landlord was awarded possession in 100% of the adjudicated
cases, with no abatement of the rent and no order for repairs, 10.8% of the
mediated agreements stated that the tenant would regain possession if the payment
plan was fulfilled or if other conditions were met (including one agreement in
which possession was contingent on the tenant entering an alcohol treatment
program). Id. at 98-99.
59. Id. at 99.
60. Additional tenant benefits included the following examples:
[O]ne landlord agreed to let the tenant store her furniture and
boxes in a locked attic room. Another landlord agreed to speak
to the other tenants in the building and request that they keep
noise levels to a minimum when the defendant/tenant was in the
building. One agreement even contained a provision stating that
the tenant could avoid eviction by entering an alcohol
rehabilitation program.
Id.
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housing (41.2%), rent abatement (23.5%), and landlord agreements
for repairs (9.8%). 61 Similarly, the 2017 review of the Baltimore
City rent court ADR pilot found that 45% of the mediated
agreements included a payment plan, 30% addressed living
conditions and agreements to perform repairs, and 35% mentioned
actions other than the rent or living conditions.62
Most poor tenants lack negotiation leverage in eviction cases,
especially when they have no cognizable legal defenses to the nonpayment of rent.63 Even in these circumstances, however, mediators
can assist the parties in negotiating a payment plan so tenants may
remain in stable housing. A day-of-trial eviction mediation program
in Franklin County, Ohio reports that it has “helped more than 3,500
residents annually avoid losing their homes through eviction.”64 The
program states that mediation “is especially critical for tenants who
have no legal defense, as their only hope of getting a pending
eviction rescinded is if they work out a voluntary resolution with
their landlord in mediation.”65
If the tenant agrees to vacate the property during mediation, the
parties can agree to a specific move-out date, providing the tenant
additional time to secure new housing. Although the tenant may
agree to vacate the property, a negotiated timeline for the move is
far less traumatic than having an armed sheriff forcibly remove a
family’s belongings. Additional time may help the family to identify
alternative living situations. Importantly, a mediated agreement
allows tenants to avoid an eviction judgment on their record. With
the wide accessibility of court records, some property owners bar
tenants based simply on a record of a prior eviction filing record,
even if the case was ultimately dismissed or if the tenant prevailed.66
To address this problem, some states allow the parties to agree to
expungement of any record of the initial eviction filing.
61. Id. at 109.
62. C-DRUM, supra note 44, at 15-19.
63. Of course, tenants need a lawyer or at least basic legal information to
understand whether they have any defenses. As described infra, some eviction
prevention programs combine the provision of legal advice with mediation
services.
64. Housing Stabilization and Homelessness Prevention Program,
COMMUNITY
MEDIATION
SERVICES
OF
CENTRAL
OHIO,
https://communitymediation.com/mediation/mediation-forindividuals/housing_disputes/housing-stabilization-homelessness-preventionprogram.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
65. Id.
66. Some jurisdictions are passing eviction sealing laws or expungement
laws to prevent access to eviction filing records unless a judgment is entered
against the tenant. See Sophie Beiers et al., Clearing the Record: How Eviction
Sealing Laws Can Advance Housing Access for Women of Color, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/racialjustice/clearing-the-record-how-eviction-sealing-laws-can-advance-housingaccess-for-women-of-color/.
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C. Ethical Challenges
While helpful in appropriate cases, day-of-trial mediation in the
eviction context presents an ethical minefield. While ethical
tensions may be present in some form in all mediations, the enormity
of the stakes and lopsided bargaining power present in eviction
mediations strain four ethical principles: impartiality, neutrality,
party self-determination, and role-slippage.
1. Impartiality
Mediators are required to be impartial, in the sense of not having
any particular connection, sympathy, or identification with one party
over the other. 67 In eviction cases, mediators might easily find
themselves rooting for the tenant. This ethical quandary may even
be baked into the eviction mediation program itself, if it defines its
mission (officially or behind the scenes) as providing assistance to
prevent an eviction and avoid homelessness. Conversely, some
mediators may approach the mediation with the goal of
accomplishing a payment plan or settlement at all costs. In their
drive towards settlement, they may put undue pressure on tenants
and favor the landlord’s business interests in collecting the rent.
As discussed above, the inherent unbalanced power structure in
eviction proceedings allows some landlords to pressure tenants into
non-mediated “hallway” deals. 68
In these non-mediated
negotiations, tenants have little opportunity to raise their own
concerns and demands, such as rent abatement, payment plans, or
repairs. As one tenant described after a “hallway negotiation” with
the landlord’s agent: “I tried negotiating. She didn’t want to hear my
side of the story but agreed to take my payments. Still, we have
nowhere else to go. I didn’t have a choice.”69
Mediation might attenuate the concern about imbalanced
opportunity to negotiate by inserting a professional third-party
neutral to facilitate the process. Mediators can reshuffle the power
relations between parties by providing the structure and time for the
tenant to share her perspective and offer potential solutions.
However, mediation may add yet another source of pressure on a
self-represented tenant—a mediator’s desire to maintain a high
settlement rate. Mediators must check their own settlement statistics
and ego at the door, and realize that from the tenant’s vantage point,
no deal might be better than a bad deal. It may be preferable for
67. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II
(2005) (defining impartiality as “freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice”)
(hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS).
68. JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 28-29.
69. Id. at 29.
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some tenants to proceed in court rather than be forced into an
unrealistic payment plan, or a settlement that exclusively favors the
landlord.
2. Neutrality
Mediator ethical standards require that mediators maintain
neutrality towards the issues under discussion, with no particular
view as to how an issue should be resolved, what standards should
be brought to bear, or who is ‘right.’ 70 Yet, given the lopsided
bargaining power between self-represented tenants and many
landlords, the potential for tenant coercion is enormous. Landlords
also may lack legal knowledge, and may misstate the law during the
mediation. Mediators might easily feel called upon to intervene by
informing tenants of their legal rights, advocating for their interests,
or appealing to landlords’ sense of morality and conscience even
when these are opposed to their financial interests and clearly stated
positions. On the flip side, some mediators might inappropriately
put pressure on tenants to settle for a payment plan, a confessed
judgment, or other terms that favor the landlord.
3. Self-determination
Mediation is premised on the notion of party self-determination,
often defined as “the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to
process and outcome.” 71 Most tenants, however, lack basic
information about their legal rights. The landlord may be in a
position to make “free and informed choices” but most selfrepresented tenants are confused, fearful, and desperate to avoid
homelessness. Even worse, landlords may misrepresent the law
during the mediation. This put mediators in the Catch-22 of
remaining neutral, which favors the landlord and coerces the tenant
to make decisions based on incorrect information, or correcting the
landlord, which violates neutrality, putting the mediator in the role
of legal advisor and risking that the mediator may misstate the law
as well. On the day of trial, tenants are under tremendous
psychological pressure to agree to any terms presented by the
landlord to keep a roof over their children’s heads, even if the
property has housing code violations or needs repairs. The shadow
cast by the court (which is just down the hall) might loom so darkly
that it compromises self-determination or essentially negates it.

70. See Hilary Astor, Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and
Practice, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 221 (2007).
71. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I.
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4. Role-slippage
The ADR field debates the nature of the mediator’s role and the
essence of the service they provide to the parties: facilitating interparty communication or providing case outcome evaluation.72 It is
widely accepted, however, that mediators are not the parties’
lawyers, and that they are not to dispense legal advice or confuse the
roles of advocate and neutral.73 Nevertheless, in seeking to address
power imbalances, it is easy to envision mediators providing parties,
and particularly tenants, information about their rights or
suggestions for legal maneuvers that would help them procedurally
or substantively.
D. Addressing Ethical Concerns
1. Combined Legal Advice or Navigator-Plus-Mediation Model
To ensure mediator neutrality and assist tenants in making
informed, self-determined decisions during a mediation, the ideal
approach combines mediation with attorneys, ombudsmen, or other
navigators who can advise tenants about their legal rights or
represent them during the mediation. Several jurisdictions use this
combined legal services and mediation approach. For example, a
local Community Mediation & Restorative Services program in
Minneapolis, Minnesota offers “housing stability mediation” in
coordination with the court. The program increases awareness of the
availability of pre-trial and day-of-trial mediation by including
information about mediation services on the summons served on the
tenant. The court facilitates the process by scheduling community
mediators for every docket. In addition to mediation, tenants receive
legal advice from volunteer attorneys at the courthouse. Some of the
attorneys represent tenants during mediation, but most of the tenants
receive information about their legal rights and then represent
themselves in mediation.
In other programs, lawyers are present in the courthouse during
the eviction docket. In the District Court for Baltimore City, for
example, a walk-in legal aid office and a tenant advocate from the
Public Justice Center are present in the courthouse. This
72. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7
(1996); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation:
Applying the Lens of Therapeutic Justice, 82 MARQUETTE L. REV. 155 (1999).
73. The ethical standard under which this principle falls is “quality of the
process.” MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard VI(A)(5) (stating “[t]he
role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional roles. Mixing the
role of a mediator and the role of another profession is problematic and thus, a
mediator should distinguish between the roles”).
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theoretically allows mediators to pause the mediation session so
tenants can seek legal information and advice before agreeing to a
settlement. Given the time constraints of the docket, however, this
may not always be realistic.
Some courts provide non-lawyer “navigators” to help selfrepresented tenants respond to failure-to-pay-rent petitions. A study
of a Navigators Pilot Project in Brooklyn Housing Court found that
tenants assisted by navigators “were 87 percent more likely than
unassisted tenants to have their defenses recognized and addressed
by the court,” and that judges ordered property owners to make
repairs 50% more often in navigator-assisted cases.74 While lawyers
are still the preferred approach, navigators could be helpful in a
mediation program context as well. Navigators perform a triage
function, helping those tenants who have cognizable legal defenses
to assert them in court, and assisting others to negotiate agreements
for rent abatement, payment plans, repairs, or other terms the court
cannot award.
Regardless of the model used, programs should not place
mediators in the dual role of advocate-mediator, or presume that
parties can process legal standards without the assistance of a lawyer
or some other type of navigator or ombudsman. One Massachusetts
eviction prevention mediation program provided a book of legal
information, dubbed the “authoritative legal resource,” that parties
could consult during mediation sessions. 75 This approach is not
advisable. Without interpretation and application to the unique facts
of the case by legal counsel, statutes are simply confusing words on
the page. Inevitably, the parties may ask the mediators what the
information means, which implicates the role-slippage problem
described above. This approach may also present significant barriers
for tenants who have limited literacy or language barriers.
In another Massachusetts program, the mediators were educated
about the law and expected to provide legal information to tenants
during mediations. 76 This approach violates mediator ethical
standards by putting the mediator in the position of playing the role

74. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND
LAWYERS, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW
YORK CITY COURT NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE PILOT PROJECTS 4
(Dec.
2016),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_
court_navigators_report_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf. The study
was funded by the American Bar Foundation and the National Center for State
Courts.
75. Joel Krutzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law:
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation,
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 93-94.
76. Id. at 111-12.
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of both attorney and neutral. Mediators and court ADR programs
should avoid the liability risks inherent in such an approach.
2. Neutral Protocols and Forms
Eviction mediation programs should ensure that their protocols
and standardized forms do not include baked-in biases for a
particular party. For example, the court in Ramsey County,
Minnesota developed a form settlement agreement for its eviction
mediation program. The form includes preprinted boxes that the
parties and mediators can use to check off provisions of the deal.
Many of the preprinted categories on the form favor the landlord’s
interests (dates and amount of rent the tenant will pay). While this
may provide a framework for negotiating a payment plan, the form
lacks preprinted sections addressing common tenant interests, such
as rent reductions or repair agreements.
Programs must develop neutral forms and practices to ensure
that the voices, interests, and needs of all parties can be part of the
process. Forms also should include open-ended portions to allow the
parties to define the terms appropriate for their situation.
3. Training for Mediators and Judges
To address impartiality concerns, programs should provide
extensive training to mediators. Mediators should understand the
general legal landscape in which these cases occur and the complex
psychological dynamics involved in these matters. Mediators should
know the professional resources available for the parties, and pause
or conclude the mediation if parties would like to seek information
or advice before agreeing to a settlement.77 This is most feasible, of
course, when mediation programs, legal services, and rental
assistance programs work cooperatively in the same courthouse.
In addition, judges who preside over eviction cases should be
educated about the mediation process. Judges who are accustomed
to resolving eviction cases in a matter of minutes need to understand
that the mediation process requires significantly more time to play
out. The mediator needs to explain the process and have the parties
sign participation agreement forms. The parties then need time to
tell their respective stories and negotiate a potential resolution.
While many judges think that mediation is more “efficient” than
77. Mediator ethical standards encourage mediators to inform the parties of
their right to consult “other professionals to help them make informed choices.”
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I(A)(2). This is often unrealistic in
the midst of a day-of-trial mediation involving self-represented parties who must
reach a deal to stop an eviction order. Having legal services and rental assistance
resources in the same courthouse may help to facilitate informed decision-making
by the parties.
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litigation, a quality mediation process will not be faster than the
typical five-minute judicial hearing in an eviction action. To allow
time for a quality mediation process, programs should consider
scheduling the docket so that the parties can first attempt to
mediate—either at an earlier date or earlier in the morning. If the
parties do not reach agreement during mediation, the case could
proceed later in the afternoon or on a different date.
Courts should not evaluate mediation programs or mediators
based solely on settlement rates. This creates undue pressure on the
mediator to violate ethical limits.78 Judges should be educated about
the mediation process and the goals of the program as well. Judges
should be encouraged to refer cases to mediation when they think
appropriate or when the parties request it.79
Docket efficiency gains from mediation should be evaluated
over the long term. Research in the small claims context has found
that if the parties reach agreement in mediation, they may be less
likely to return to court in the future.80 The study also study found
that parties who participated in mediation were more likely to report
that the court cared about them, regardless of whether they reached
agreement in mediation.81 And, we suggest, efficiency assessments
should expand beyond immediate docket clearing and take into
account efficiency benefits of mediation as compared to other
publicly funded systems beyond the courthouse. If a case takes a
couple hours to mediate but saves parties dozens of hours of future
interaction with other public systems (health, homeless services,
education, employment, etc.), focusing only on judicial resources
makes little sense, given they are all ultimately funded from the
same state budget.
78. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides: “A mediator
shall not undermine party self-determination by any party for reasons such as
higher settlement rates, egos, increased fees, or outside pressure from court
personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the media or others.”
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I(B) (self-determination).
79. One of the reported challenges of the rent division ADR pilot in
Baltimore City, for example, was the lack of referrals to mediation when the
parties requested mediation. The program is set up such that a landlord or tenant
must “request” mediation by filling out an orange paper form. The review of the
pilot found that even when parties had filled out the form requesting mediation,
some judges simply ignored them and proceeded to the hearing. C-DRUM, supra
note 44, at 13-14 (noting that about half of the cases in which a party requested
mediation was referred to mediation by the judge). At a minimum, courts should
make parties aware of the availability of mediation services and allow them to
mediate when both wish to do so.
80. Charkoudian, Eisenberg, & Walter, supra note 43, at 21 (finding that
small claims cases that reached agreement in ADR were 21% less likely to return
to court for enforcement action within one year as compared to cases adjudicated
by the judge, settled by the parties in the “hallway” without ADR, or not settled
in ADR).
81. Id. at 26.
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Thus far, we have discussed the benefits that mediation may
offer to parties and the system even when conducted under
significant constraints: last minute, in the courthouse, with eviction
looming, power imbalances at their utmost, and a judge down the
hall ready to hear the matter. Next, we explore how reducing these
constraints by implementing mediation before, rather than at, the
courthouse can offer parties and the “system” far more significant
benefits. We begin by exploring the potential of pushing this
intervention back before the sharpest conflict watershed, with
mediation taking place before the filing of an eviction action. Next,
we consider moving such intervention even further upstream in the
rental relationship.
III. PRE-FILING COMMUNICATION AND MEDIATION
Some evictions might be prevented if property owners and
tenants communicated earlier in the life of an emerging problem.
Tenants may be reluctant to speak up about life circumstances—for
example, a job loss, unexpected medical cost, or family
emergency—that imposes a temporary hardship that affects the
ability to pay rent. Some landlords are willing to work with tenants
who proactively raise issues and attempt to work out a plan. Tenants
also may need assistance requesting repairs to the property.
Emerging technological applications provide tenants with tools to
facilitate communication about late rent and needed repairs. For
example, a consortium of law schools and technology companies
collaborated to design a free, web-based program called “Hello
Landlord.” The platform assists tenants in generating letters to their
landlords when they cannot pay the rent or need to request repairs.82
The program seeks to provide an “upstream solution” that targets “a
communication gap” when tenants feel powerless or hesitant to
reach out to landlords about a missing payment or other rental
issues.83
When bilateral communications between the property owner and
tenant fail, the parties may need the assistance of a neutral mediator
to facilitate their conversations. To be most beneficial for all parties
involved, mediation should occur well in advance of an eviction
filing. This reduces sunk costs on the conflict—costs that can
82. See HELLO LANDLORD, https://hellolandlord.org/about/. The program
“was created by LawX, the legal design lab at BYU Law School, the Innovation
for Justice (i4J) Program at the University of Arizona College of Law, and
SixFifty, the technology subsidiary of the law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati.” Id.
83. Landlords Do Not Want Eviction: A New Online Tenant-Landlord
Communication Tool to Help, RENTAL HOUSING J. (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://rentalhousingjournal.com/landlords-do-not-want-eviction-a-new-onlinetenant-landlord-communication-tool-to-help/.
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sometimes challenge resolution even more than the original conflict
trigger (e.g., late payment of rent) does. Pre-filing mediation also
helps tenants to avoid a stain on their rental history that could impair
future housing opportunities. Finally, pre-filing mediation gives the
parties more time to procure rental assistance and other resources to
avoid an eviction or plan for a mutually agreeable move out date.
Pre-filing mediation also offers process flexibility and
convenience lacking in the court process. Mediations can be
scheduled at times and locations mutually convenient for the parties,
including evenings and weekends. This allows the parties to avoid
taking time off work. Once the case enters the court system,
scheduling is out of the parties’ hands and a failure to appear can
result in the loss of one’s case.
In addition to efficiency and convenience benefits, the mediation
process itself can model effective communication and problem
solving and help the parties to build a stronger relationship. In this
sense, not only does pre-filing mediation resolve the immediate
problem, it also acts to build constructive patterns for future
conflicts. Day-of-trial mediation arrives at the end of a sharp
conflictual interaction and focuses on putting out the presenting fire
(i.e., non-payment of rent) rather than addressing the range of issues
important to both parties in the rental relationship.
IV. UPSTREAM CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES
The complexity of the eviction crisis requires us to think beyond
the specific dispute resolution process to use in a particular eviction
case already filed in court. To be sure, adding mediation as a pretrial or day-of-trial option may serve as a safety net and provide the
benefits described above for some parties. But this will not dam the
river of eviction matters rushing towards adjudication; at best, on its
own, the effect of these programs is akin to a stone that slightly alters
the river’s flow.
Given the complexity of the eviction epidemic, we need to apply
a wider “ADR lens,” one that does not zoom in on mediating
eviction cases but rather identifies and addresses brewing problems
at an earlier stage. Identifying how this wider ADR perspective
might be helpful requires loosening our focus on eviction conflict
per se, and instead exploring the underlying sources of conflict,
which may be structural (systemic poverty and a dysfunctional legal
process) or relational (patterns of interaction and communication
between property owners and tenants). Exploring discrete
interactional stages of the rental relationship through conflict
analysis and dispute resolution glasses allows us to recognize the
moments fraught with potential for conflict generation and
escalation. We also should look beyond the rental relationship itself
to examine how conflicts in other aspects of the tenant’s life—their
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employment, health, family dynamics, etc.—may lead to adverse
consequences that put the tenant on a path towards housing
instability.
A. Structural Conflicts and Early Intervention Programs
For many tenants, the source of conflict leading to eviction is
structural, not relational:84 the tenant simply does not have sufficient
income or resources to pay the rent. This may be a temporary job
loss or a sudden medical bill, or it may be more systemic poverty
and lack of affordable housing options. Given the structural nature
of the conflict, neither traditional litigation nor mediation will
address the full scope of the problem. We need policy reforms that
increase affordable housing, provide rental assistance, and attack the
systemic causes of poverty.
Even so, there may be ways to assist tenants at the nascent stages
of a crisis. Some jurisdictions have developed collaborative
intervention programs that attempt to address problems at an earlier
stage to avoid later evictions. These programs seek to reduce
evictions and homelessness by supporting the tenant in resolving
non-housing issues (employment, health, etc.) that may later affect
their ability to pay rent.
San Francisco’s Conflict Intervention Service (“CIS”) provides
one of the best examples of an upstream eviction prevention
program.85 CIS attempts to identify tenants at risk of missing rental
payments and intervenes early to help the tenant resolve many
different types of conflicts. CIS broadens the definition of
“mediation” into problem solving of all kinds. CIS “mediators” help
tenants resolve conflicts with social service providers and other
entities to keep the tenant’s housing situation stable.86 Social service
providers refer tenants to CIS as soon as they encounter difficulties
that could later affect their financial and housing stability.
Another Eviction Diversion Program in Kalamazoo, Michigan
brings together state health and human services, public assistance,
tenant legal services, nonprofit charitable organizations, and the

84. Christopher Moore theorizes that conflicts arise from a variety of
sources, including: structure, data, values, interests, and relationships.
CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d ed. 2004).
85. Roger Moss, Conflict Intervention Service: How an Innovative
Mediation Program Prevents Evictions, BAR ASS’N S.F. (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://blog.sfbar.org/2018/09/26/conflict-intervention-service-how-aninnovative-mediation-program-prevents-evictions/.
86. These are not “mediators” in the traditional sense. They seem to serve a
variety of functions—such as ombuds, social worker, navigator, advocate, and
conflict resolver, depending upon the needs of the tenant.
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judicial system to provide resources to deter evictions. 87 The
program attempts to find solutions before an eviction filing, when
tenants are no more than three months behind on their rent.
The Program continues to support tenants if the property owner
ultimately files for eviction. On the day of the hearing, attorneys
from legal aid or law school clinical law programs conduct intake
with tenants as they check in for the day’s docket. The tenant
receives legal advice about her rights and options. An attorney may
assist the tenant in negotiating a deal with the property owner to
avoid eviction. Qualified tenants may receive bridge funds to pay
the rent. The program may help tenants find affordable housing to
avoid homelessness. Importantly, landlord attorneys and judges are
typically supportive of the program, which not only helps tenants
avoid eviction and stay in their homes, but also decreases court
dockets and the landlord’s expense in pursuing evictions capable of
resolution. This combination of early intervention work plus legal
services and mediation at the courthouse has had significant impact:
eviction judgments in Kalamazoo have decreased by 73% and
homelessness is down 9%.88
Beyond early conflict intervention strategies, there are other
programs which, while not mediation-focused, provide tenant
services that could be augmented with conflict-specific aims and
expertise. Amongst these are low-income housing programs that
take a holistic approach to promoting housing stability for
vulnerable tenants.
The non-profit program CommonBond, for example, provides
support to tenants in order to help them achieve independence in
three foundational areas: education and advancement, community
building and engagement, and health and wellness.89 While not a
mediation program per se, CommonBond emphasizes the need to
listen to and support residents in navigating complex systems and
overcoming conflicts in the foundational areas of their lives. There
may be opportunities to integrate mediation services into programs
such as CommonBond to help tenants address conflicts as early as
possible.

87. According to one report, “[t]he project brings together representatives
from the Department of Human Services, Legal Aid of Western Michigan, Eighth
District Court, United Way, the City of Kalamazoo, 2-1-1- and Housing
Resources, Inc.” a non-profit that assists individuals experiencing a housing crisis.
Kathy Jennings, Working Together to Keep People in their Homes, SECOND
WAVE (May 17, 2012), https://www.secondwavemedia.com/southwestmichigan/features/2lesshomelessness0517.aspx.
88. Id.
89. See
COMMON
BOND
COMMUNITIES,
https://commonbond.org/advantage-services/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
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B. Relational Conflict Escalation
While many tenants experience eviction as one of the collateral
consequences of structural poverty, evictions may also result from a
pattern of conflict interaction between the parties to the rental
relationship.
Evictions are not born in the courthouse, nor do they magically
come into being at the moment the landlord files a court complaint.
The presenting cause is typically the tenant’s non-payment of rent.
Inevitably, events, circumstances and conditions occurring long
before non-payment of rent affected or determined whether rent
would be paid, as well as whether this would result in an eviction
action. Some of these events, circumstances, and conditions relate
to realms familiar to those working in the housing or poverty law
fields. For example, events related to employment, health, and
family circumstances feed into an inability to pay rent later down
the line.90
Other eviction triggers may relate to patterns of interaction
between the property owner and tenant. For example, a tenant may
withhold rent due to a lack of communication or action from the
landlord to make a promised repair. A landlord may use an eviction
filing to “communicate” with a tenant who has been avoiding the
landlord’s calls. A tenant may avoid the landlord’s calls because she
feels embarrassed to share events happening in her life that may be
impacting her ability to pay rent.
Considering the eviction crisis through the lens of conflict
theory offers a ‘root cause’ approach to understand, first, how
something becomes a conflict in the first place and, second, how
conflicts escalate in scope and intensity over time. Taken together,
these models may help to explain the sources of conflict, which may
be structural (lack of affordable housing, lack of access to legal
services, and lack of access to health services, to name a few) or
interactional (the path from peaceful rental relationships to fullblown, take-no-prisoners conflict across many contexts).
Understanding these sources and patterns of conflict may identify
opportune “off-ramps”—points at which a situation may be resolved
earlier by addressing the structural or relational tensions causing the
conflict.
1. Conflict formation
Richard Felstiner, William Able, and Austin Sarat have
theorized that ‘issues’ or ‘problems’ become ‘disputes’ or ‘conflicts’
90. For example, a death in the family might incur immediate burial and
funeral costs, causing the family to fall behind on rent. The impact would be more
severe if the deceased was a primary wage earner for the family.
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by going through three stages of transformation, which they dub
“naming, claiming and blaming.”91
a. Naming
The first transformation leading to conflict is the situation’s shift
from being an “unPIE” to a “PIE”—that is, from an unperceived
injurious experience, to a perceived injurious experience.
“Perceiving” an injury means consciously recognizing that
something harmful has occurred to us. We experience many
potential slights over the course of a day that we may tune out.
Imagine walking down a city street and being bumped by others or
overlooking an unreturned text or phone call. Most of the minor
harms and distresses we go through in the course of our lives remain
unPIEs. Recognizing or naming the event and the harm--“I called
the tenant about the late rent and she is ignoring my calls”-transforms the slight into a PIE.
b. Blaming
The next step along the path to conflict occurs when we attribute
the PIE to the fault of someone else and believe that they should do
something to rectify the situation. Your injurious experience has
transformed into a grievance, which includes blame for the past and
expectations for the future. However, we may keep this grievance to
ourselves, rather than continue along the path to conflict. In fact, we
do so most of the time.92
c. Claiming
In some cases, we decide to air our grievance directly to the
person, entity, or organization we believe to be at fault, and express
91. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 631 (1981).
92. In the legal dispute literature, this is known as ‘lumping it’: having cause
for a legal claim, but preferring not to pursue it. As the benefits are outweighed
by the time, costs and effort of pursuing the claim; even if you are sure you will
win—the odds of which add yet another factor—risk—to the economically driven
choice of pursuing a conflict. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974). The conflict literature provides other reasons for not advancing a claim,
suggesting that many people are conflict-avoidant and consciously or
unconsciously refrain from advancing their grievances to the claiming phase. See
BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 42-47(2d ed. 2012). We
introduce lumping it and conflict avoidance at this transformational stage, as this
is where it is most common; of course, people who have pursued an issue through
to the claiming stage often choose to lump legal disputes, or to avoid conflict,
once it has already fully transformed.
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our expectation that they take action to remedy the situation. This is
called claiming. At this point we are on the brink of conflict, but it
is not fully formed.
If the landlord confronts the tenant, reprimands them for being
late with the rent, and demands immediate payment, two paths
divide. On one path, the tenant responds and pays the rent. On the
other, the tenant says “I don’t owe you anything—you need to fix
the leaky roof first, then I’ll pay you rent,” or even, “I don’t have it
now, I’ll pay you in a week.” Down the first path, the situation is
defused. All the alternatives on the second path, on the other hand,
lead to conflict. Conflict comes to life the moment we make a claim,
and the other party rejects it. Rejecting our claim might take the
form of saying “No” (or far less polite things) explicitly. It might
take other forms, such as saying, “I’ll get back to you” and not doing
so. It might take the form of a counteroffer, which essentially rejects
our claim before offering something else.
2. Conflict Escalation
Once conflict emerges, it typically does not subside or resolve
on its own. It continues to transform, usually in an escalatory
fashion.93 Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim94 describe five types of
transformations that commonly occur as conflict escalates:95
Conflict turns from light to heavy: Parties sharpen their tactics,
responding to a previously sharpened tactic by their counterpart. A
tenant confronts a landlord, requesting repair of the broken light
fixtures in the hall. The landlord agrees, but fails to fix the lights.
The tenant begins calling the landlord weekly, then daily. The
landlord screens the tenant’s calls. The tenant begins leaving
garbage bags out in the hallway, underneath the light fixtures, rather
than disposing of them. The landlord notifies the tenant she is in
behavioral violation of the contract. The tenant writes back that she
is withholding rent until the light fixtures are repaired.
Conflict moves from small to large: Single-issue conflicts turn
into multi-issue conflicts, and as they do, each party incrementally
93. Escalation, as a term, can express one party using sharper tactics,
intending to increase the pressure on their counterpart in excess of the pressure
they experienced at the previous phase. It can also mean that, overall, the intensity
of the conflict as experienced by both parties and perhaps by all around them has
risen. These meanings overlap, largely because as one party takes escalatory
action towards the other, the other responds in kind; the outcome is that the overall
conflict intensity has risen. See DEAN PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL
CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 88-89 (3d ed. 2004).
94. Id. at 88-92.
95. Note that these transformations do not all always occur, nor do they
appear in any particular sequence, but all are commonly observed in conflict.
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commits increasing resources to the conflict. Consider this scenario:
a conflict over a few days’ delay in paying the rent transforms as the
landlord accuses the tenant of a series of behavioral infractions. The
tenant, in turn, responds by accusing the landlord of failing to fix
windows that allow cold air and rain to seep in, raising the utility
bills. The tenant demands that the landlord replace or seal the
windows and pay for the utility costs. The landlord threatens
eviction for failing to pay rent. The landlord files for eviction.
Conflict over specific issues become general conflicts:
Sometimes a conflict about a single issue snowballs into a much
larger dispute. For example, a landlord informs a tenant she has
received complaints about noise from a neighbor, and he needs to
keep it down. The tenant tells the landlord to install insulation in the
paper-thin walls if she wants quiet in the building. The landlord
informs the tenant she has received multiple complaints about the
tenant regarding noise and smoke coming from the apartment. The
tenant calls the landlord a slumlord and starts to ignore the
landlord’s calls. The landlord files for eviction.
Parties’ goals shift and orient against the other: At some point
during a conflict, parties stop perceiving the situation as an attempt
to better their situation or to prevent the other from harming them.
Instead, they want to win—to achieve an outcome that betters their
situation more than the other party’s outcome betters theirs. As
conflict continues to transform, parties may no longer focus on their
own outcome or situation at all; instead, they focus on causing or
maximizing harm to the other party.
At first, a landlord might file for eviction in hopes of getting
unpaid back rent, as they need the cash for some repairs around the
property. When the tenant refuses to pay, the landlord wants to get
their money back and “teach the tenant a lesson.” By the time they
reach court, the landlord may want to drag the tenant through the
legal mud, kick them off the property, and put a mark on their
permanent record—even though none of this brings them any closer
to effecting the repairs they had hoped to make.
The number of people involved grows: Even when a conflict
begins between two individuals, the number of individuals involved
tends to multiply over time. Consider this scenario: a property
manager might bring in the landlord and an attorney to engage with
a tenant who is behind on their rent. The tenant might involve friends
and family, housing and welfare services, attorneys, other renters on
the property, etc. This results in more interactions, more voices, and
an audience effect that escalates conflict.
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3. Attribution Theory
An additional concept known as “attribution theory” is helpful
for understanding why people make the shift from naming to
blaming and claiming; as well as for understanding why people tend
to respond to each other’s moves with more intense escalatory
tactics. Attribution theory suggests that our beliefs—conscious or
unconscious—about why another person took the action he did
influence our interpretation of and response to that action.96
One commonly encountered pattern is called “false attribution
error”: when someone does something that harms us, we tend to
attribute her actions to her disposition or character, rather than her
circumstances.97 For example, when a tenant fails to pay rent, the
landlord is likely to assume that the tenant is a freeloader, rather than
consider whether the delay is due to an unfortunate hardship.
A closely related judgmental pattern is called “actor/observer
bias”: we tend to ascribe our own harm-causing actions to our
circumstances, whereas we ascribe others’ actions, similar as they
may be, to their character.98 If I, as a landlord, fix a broken water
heater two weeks after the date by which I promised to do it, I will
explain to myself that this reasonable delay happened because I was
very busy and had a lot of work to do. But if my tenant pays the rent
two weeks late, I may view this as ugly behavior that stems from his
poor character.
Another form of attribution is “negative or sinister attribution,”99
which occurs when someone does something that harms us, and we
ascribe this harm not to circumstances, and not even to their
character, but to their intent. We assume that the actor was targeting
us, specifically, and that their motive was malevolent. For example,
if our tenant does not pay the rent on time, we might not attribute
this to their circumstances or even to their character as, for example,
lazy freeloaders. Instead, we may perceive that they did this because
they are out to harm us in particular, seeking to make us miss our
mortgage payment or go into bankruptcy.
Returning to the conflict formation and escalation patterns
discussed above, it is easy to see how attribution plays a role in
96. For discussion of the different types of attribution mentioned in this
section, see Keith G. Allred, Anger and Retaliation in Conflict: The Role of
Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 236 (Morton Deutsch
& Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For discussion of this form of attribution, see Roderick Kramer, The
Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Groups
and Organizations, 18 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 199 (1994); see also Barbara
Lopes et al., Coping with Perceived Abusive Supervision: The Role of Paranoia,
26 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 237 (2019).
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moving the conflict along the formation and escalation spiral. When
someone does something that harms us, we may attribute it to their
poor character or hostile intent. As a result, it is hard to consider not
blaming them, and not airing our grievances and demands.
Moreover, when we experience someone else’s escalatory behavior,
we are pre-wired to interpret this not as a rational defense to our own
previous escalation; rather, we are conditioned to see it as proof that
the other person sought to harm us intentionally, out of the hostility
they bear towards us. Naturally, our next move is likely to ratchet
up the conflict even more. And remember—even as attribution
carries us through these transformations, it is doing the same thing
to our counterpart.
4. Opportunities for Upstream Relational Conflict Intervention
In our working session at the symposium, 100 we asked
participants in the group (which included field workers in housing
and poverty support agencies, attorneys representing tenants and
corporate landlords, court staff and housing court referees) to share
some common stories leading to eviction based on real or an
aggregation of real cases. During this conversation, many
participants emphasized the number of evictions that could be
avoided if landlords received training in basic conflict resolution
skills.
Participants stressed that it is imperative for landlords to
understand the value of establishing positive communication and
problem-solving relationships with tenants. They suggested that
different jurisdictions could provide these trainings as a condition of
granting a rental license. The participants emphasized that landlords
should be educated about the potential benefits of using mediation
and other conflict resolution interventions at the earliest possible
stage.
One study found that landlords and property managers serially
use the eviction process and the threat of eviction as a means of debt
collection, not to regain possession of the property.101 If landlords
100. This article was written as part of the Mitchell-Hamline School of Law
2019 Symposium, An Intentional Conversation about ADR Interventions:
Eviction, Poverty, and Other Collateral Consequences. The participants in our
group included attorneys representing tenants and property owners, judges and
housing court personnel, non-profit service providers, and anti-poverty
organizations.
101. Philip M.E. Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use
the Threat of Eviction, 18 CITY & COMMUNITY 638 (2019). The housing laws in
some jurisdictions provide an incentive for the landlord to file for eviction as early
as possible, rather than work things out with the tenant. For example, in Baltimore
City, the tenant’s right to redeem (or “pay to stay” in) the property is foreclosed
after four eviction judgments. This may encourage landlords to rack up at least

2020 Symposium]

Eisenberg & Ebner

153

understood that non-court conflict resolution processes could help
them communicate with tenants and facilitate feasible payment
schedules, that might decrease the use of the court eviction process
as a rent collection mechanism.
In addition to landlord education, the symposium participants
identified key points along the lifespan of the rental relationship that
had high conflict potential. Timely intervention at these stages might
de-escalate conflict, address problems at an earlier stage, and
prevent a later missed rent payment or eviction filing.
The chart found at Appendix A summarizes the collective
thinking of our session participants, as well as some after-the-fact
application of the conflict dynamics theory described above, to the
stages in the rental relationship ripe for conflict interventions or
mediation. At these points, party communication could be
facilitated, expectations could be clarified, questions could be
posed, problems could be addressed, and cooperative
communication could develop and be nurtured. Combined, these
present a map of the conflict generation, escalation, prevention, and
resolution potential identified at each stage of rental relationship.
For many—perhaps most—tenants affected by the eviction
crisis, the systemic problem leading to the missed rental payment is
structural poverty and lack of affordable housing, not necessarily a
pattern of conflict escalation with the property owner or its agents.
Even in these circumstances, however, earlier communication about
emerging financial problems or repair issues may help the parties
de-escalate conflicts, connect them with resources and rental
assistance, and prevent later eviction filings.
V.

CONCLUSION

While neither traditional litigation nor mediation approaches
alone can fully address the eviction epidemic, a coordinated
response that integrates early conflict intervention services and
mediation options may help to prevent many evictions. In addition,
both parties in the rental relationship, especially landlords, should
be educated about how their patterns of interaction in the early
stages of the rental relationship and as problems arise have the
potential to escalate conflict in destructive ways. Likewise, tenants
need education and support to facilitate early communication and
problem solving with property owners as soon as problems in any
aspect of their lives emerge that may later impact their housing
stability.
Finally, courts, eviction prevention programs, tenant advocates,
and property owner associations should collaborate with community
three eviction judgments, giving them greater power to remove a tenant upon a
fourth filing.
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mediation and law school ADR programs to identify opportunities
for the integration of conflict de-escalation measures. Early
mediation and conflict intervention strategies may help to alleviate
the need for eviction filings in the first place, and resolve such cases
in ways that avoid the devastating systemic impacts of eviction for
families and the larger community.
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APPENDIX A: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION IN
THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
Stage

Description

Conflict
potential

Internal
Opportunities

External
Interventions

Showing
the property

The owner or
its agent
(hereinafter
“landlord”)
shows the
residence to
the
prospective
tenant. The
landlord
points out the
benefits of
the property
and its
facilities, and
gauges the
viewer and
their
suitability.
The viewer
assesses the
residence’s
suitability.

Parties on
their best
behavior,
rather than
sharing
realities.

Opportunity to
share
information

Opportunity for
tenant
education about
general legal
rights and
questions to
consider at this
stage

Landlord
“selling”
property,
glossing over
flaws,
making
promises to
fix, etc.
Asymmetric
information
exists. The
tenant may
not
understand
their rights or
know what
questions to
ask.
Discussion
centers on
everything
going right,
not on what
can go wrong

Application
submission

The
prospective
tenant
generally
fills out a
questionnaire
and provides
personal
information.
Often, the
tenant pays a
nonrefundable
application
fee. The
landlord
reviews the
application

This process
serves only
the
landlord’s
interests,
causes
information
imbalance,
and is funded
by tenant.

Housing
referral
agencies could
vet landlords,
or collect
reputation
information,
and publish it,
to balance
information.

Tenant
invests effort
in filling out
forms,
money, and
time waiting
for response

Online landlord
reputation sites
could be
supported and
improved.
Specifically,
such sites could
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and/or
submits it to
a tenant
screening
agency for a
review of the
tenant’s
history, etc.

at this stage.
These sunk
costs weaken
their
negotiation
power and
reduce their
tendency to
withdraw in
the face of
poor
conditions or
practices.
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provide
information on
application-fee
scams.
Passage and
enforcement of
laws to prevent
application fee
scams.

Bad-apple
landlords use
this stage as
a moneymaking
opportunity
—screen
applicants
one at a time,
accept the
first who
passes, keep
the rest of the
fees even if
rest of
applicants
are not
screened.
Lease
negotiation

The landlord
provides a
form
contract,
filling in
most of the
details—e.g.
rental term,
rent, security
deposit, and
other
terms—
themselves.
Lease is
contract of
adhesion and
tenants have
little to no
power to
negotiate, but
may be able
to ask for
accommodation on

Information
imbalance
One-time vs.
experienced
landlord
One sided:
Tenant’s
duties,
landlord
rights
Tendency to
focus on
positional
bargaining,
or no
realistic
opportunity
for tenant to
negotiate

Opportunity to
put tenantspecific
information in
the lease—e.g.,
date of rent
payment;
Opportunity to
clarify process
for early
problem
solving

Housing
advocates and
referral
agencies could
review specific
contracts to
provide advice.
They could
maintain a
collection of
leases landlords
use, and advise
tenants about
potential
unlawful
clauses and
points worthy
of negotiation
Community
mediation
centers could
offer lease
negotiation
assistance,
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specific
issues (e.g.
rent payment
date)

Handover
of keys

First
problem
report by
tenant

The new
tenant
receives the
keys and the
right to
inhabit the
home.
Sometimes,
this is done
at a joint
meeting at
the home,
other times
in a property
management
office.

At some
point during
the rental, the
tenant
approaches
the landlord
to raise an
issue or
make a
request. This
name, blame,
claim process
might be a
reminder of
promises
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during which
parties could
clarify
expectations,
define a process
for resolving
disputes, and
raise issues.
This might
be the first
time the
tenant sees
actual home.
May have
been
promised a
different
unit. Perhaps
repairs or
maintenance
were not
completed,
or housing
code
violations
exist. Tenant
may attribute
bad motives
to the
landlord

This is a
significant
moment in the
relationship.
Landlords
could enact
rituals and
processes
aimed at
enhancing trust,
mutual
responsibility,
and ongoing
communication
throughout the
relationship.

From
landlord’s
perspective,
this is the
first
opportunity
to label the
tenant as a
“troublemaker,” or to
establish
patterns of
open
communication and

Opportunity to
improve
property, to
overcome a
challenging
moment, to
review the
lease, to
communicate
and resolve
issues as they
arise

Housing
agencies could
develop a
checklist for
documentation
of repair issues
upon move-in,
to be provided
to tenants and
landlords.
Landlords
should develop
early conflict
resolution
protocols to
encourage
tenants to raise
issues as soon
as possible
Courts should
educate
landlords and
tenants about
available
mediation
services from
the court, law
school clinics,
or community
mediation
programs
Early
intervention
programs that
help tenants
communicate
issues to
landlords in
constructive
ways, and that
also protect
their legal
rights by
providing
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made in the
showing or
the lease
negotiation
that have yet
to be
fulfilled, a
maintenance
issue, a
complaint
about another
tenant on the
property, or
anything
else.
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problemsolving

record of
communication

First time
landlord
stands to
spend/lose
directly on
this tenant.

Online
communication
support
programs, such
as “Hello
Landlord”

The topic
may be one
not
specifically
mentioned in
the lease, or
be a matter
of
perception.
Landlord
rejection of
the claim
instigates
conflict,
which might
escalate.

First
problem
report by
landlord
(other than
demand for
rent)

The landlord
approaches
the tenant to
raise an issue
or make a
request. This
might be a
reminder of
promises
made in the
showing or
the lease
negotiation
that have not
been
fulfilled, a
request to
maintain the
premises in a
better
condition
(e.g., noise,
trash, yard,
smoking,
parking)

The topic
may be one
not
specifically
mentioned in
the lease, or
be a matter
of
perception.
The tenant
may feel in
the right, and
the landlord
may rely on a
power-based,
command
approach
Tenant might
feel third
parties are to
blame for the
situation.
Tenant
rejection of
the claim
instigates
conflict,

Opportunity to
improve
property, to
overcome a
challenging
moment, to
review the
lease, to
establish
constructive
problem
solving.
Opportunity to
convene
conversations
involving
others and
reach group
understandings.

Landlord
certification
can require
basic
communication
and conflict
resolution
training and
make landlord
aware of
community
supports for
difficult
conversations,
such as
community
mediation
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which might
escalate.
First broken
promise on
either side

Late notice

This may
precede the
events
described
above, or
follow them.
It is a general
catch-all
name for the
first
occurrence of
a promise
being
broken, or
perceived as
being
broken. This
could be a
late rent
payment, a
delay of
handing over
the keys, a
failure to
show up on
time and fix
something,
or anything
else. The
focus here is
on the breach
of a promise
or lease
provision,
not its
reporting to
the other
party.
The tenant
has not paid
rent on time,
and has
received
notice in
some form
(letter, text,
angry call
from
landlord) that
they must
pay by
certain date
or legal
action may
be pursued

Triggering of
the conflict
“name and
blame” spiral
The party
who feels
wronged now
views the
other party in
a different
light
(negative
attribution).
This changes
their
perception
not only of
the harmful
act, but of
the other’s
character,
intentions,
trustworthine
ss, or
integrity.

False,
negative, or
sinister
attribution
error kicks in
on the
landlord’s
side with the
missed
payment; it
may kick in
on the
tenant’s side
with the late
notice,
especially if
the tenant
perceives the

Opportunity to
initiate a
conversation, to
consult outside
experts
(lawyers), to
ask an outsider
to intervene.

Landlord
certification
can require
basic conflict
resolution
training and
make landlord
aware of
community
supports for
difficult
conversations,
such as
community
mediation
Lease can
clarify conflict
resolution
processes,
including
mediation

The moment of
demand is also
a moment to
defuse: In this
typical name,
blame, claim
situation,
conflict can be
avoided by
handing over a
check, or
apprising the
landlord of
special
circumstances
and agreeing to

Lease can
clarify grace
period for rent
due date and
process for
notifying the
landlord of the
need for special
accommodation
s in the event of
hardship
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alternative
payment date.

The standard
wording of
the notice
might
include some
ominous
threat of
legal
proceedings
or ‘full
extent of the
law’.
Ominous
meanings
might be
read into
benign
wording.
Eviction
preparation

The landlord
prepares the
paperwork
necessary for
eviction or
hires and
attorney or
agent to do
so for them.

Investment—
time, money
or both—in
the eviction
proceeding.
The conflict
may have
been handed
over to
someone else
(an agent or
lawyer), and
involving
their set of
interests
makes it
harder to
walk things
back.

At this point,
eviction
preparers might
review tenant’s
record to see if
this is isolated
incident or ongoing pattern

Opportunity to
connect tenant
with rental
assistance or
other resources
Opportunity to
negotiate
agreement for
payment plan,
repair timeline
(if applicable),
or specific
move out date
if on-going
affordability
issue

Tenant
initiatives
might be
ignored by
the landlord:
“It’s out of
my hands.”

Eviction
filing &
tenant
notification

The landlord
or their agent
files the
eviction
action

More time
and money
has been
invested, and
there are by

Opportunity for
mediation or
early conflict
intervention
services to
identify the
cause of the
late payment,
especially if
first-time
incident

Opportunity for
mediated
conversation

Court forms
should include
information
about local
mediation or
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(summary
ejectment,
unlawful
detainer, etc.)
with the
court.
The tenant
receives
notice of the
eviction
proceeding
from the
court. They
share the
news with
others,
receive
advice and
opinions, and
perhaps seek
out more
expert
advice.
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now
additional
conflict facts
on the
ground.
Landlord
may be
surprised
when tenant
avoids their
calls and
does not pay
rent even
after eviction
action filed.
Tenant, in
turn, is
insulted by
the eviction
filing and
vows to
withhold rent
and/or file a
counterclaim.
Receiving
the notice is
experienced
as sharp
conflict
escalation.
False,
negative,
and/or
sinister
attribution
error kick in
on the
tenant’s side.
Tenants
might receive
sympathy but
bad advice.
They might
be
empowered
to take
unhelpful
action, or
discouraged
from taking
helpful
action.

prior to trial
date
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conflict
intervention
services and
rental
assistance
programs for
tenants
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Tenant is
likely to
counterescalate,
such as by
vowing to
withhold rent
to save for
new place, or
preparing to
raise housing
violations as
counterclaim
The
investment of
the filing fee
has made
non-eviction
solutions less
appealing to
the landlord
(This is
called “The
$400
problem,” in
Minnesota
due to the
high cost of
filing; other
jurisdictions
have low
filing fees
(e.g., $15 in
Maryland),
making
eviction
actions a low
cost
proposition
for
landlords).
Waiting
period

This is a
period of a
few days or
1-2 weeks,
until the case
is due to be
heard in
court.

In this
period, both
sides
ruminate on
the situation,
attributing
bad motives
to the other
side. This
stewing
might seek
outlet,
unlikely to

Opportunity for
mediated
conversation
prior to trial
date

Court forms
should include
information
about local
mediation or
conflict
intervention
services and
rental
assistance
programs for
tenants. Rental
assistance
programs
should not
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be
constructive.

Courthouse
steps
negotiation
/ day-oftrial
mediation

At the
courthouse,
parties meet,
presenting a
natural
opportunity
for
negotiation.
In some
jurisdictions,
parties are
sent/offered
to participate
in a
mediationish process
before the
hearing.

Extreme
power
imbalance.
Tenant
operating out
of fear of
eviction, or
anger about
condition of
property due
to landlord’s
failure to
repair, or
shame at
being sued
when the
problem
stems from
structural
poverty or
other crises
in their lives
(health,
domestic
violence).
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require formal
eviction court
order as
prerequisite for
assistance.
Opportunity for
day-of-trial
mediation,
combined with
availability of
tenant legal
services or
navigators to
advise tenants
of their rights
and potential
resources

Establishment
of day-of-trial
mediation
programs,
combined with
legal
information and
services and
tenant
resources

Judges have
opportunity to
educate parties
about available
courthouse
programs
(mediation and
legal services)

Establishment
of day-of-trial
mediation
programs,
combined with
legal
information and
services and

Tenant may
be pressured
into
“hallway”
deals with
landlord’s
agent, with
no
opportunity
to discuss
their own
concerns and
needs or
negotiate
terms
favorable to
them
Hearing

Parties
appear before
a judge or
referee. In
contrast to
many other
civil
procedures

Tenant is
marginalized
and may not
understand
the process
or her legal
rights.
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Post hearing
/ agreement
compliance
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and to small
claims, in
most
jurisdictions
this is a very
short
procedure,
focusing on
whether
payment was
made; littleto-no effort
is made on
bringing
parties to an
agreed-upon
resolution.

Tenant
viewed as the
offender/

Whether the
proceeding
ended in
judgment or
an
agreement,
parties
comply (or
do not) with
the outcome.
Over the
course of the
period until
compliance,
they may
interact with
each other
numerous
times. Even
if the
outcome is
the tenant
vacating the
home, this
may not
happen
immediately.

If parties do
not comply,
the potential
for conflict
returns and
snowballs.
Parties have
more broken
promises to
each other
than they did
the first time
around and
their trust has
diminished.

debtor.
Tenant
attempts to
share her
side of the
story; may be
interrupted or
rejected as
irrelevant.

and refer
appropriate
cases to
mediation

[41

tenant
resources
Schedule
docket later in
day so parties
may attempt
mediation prior
to the hearing

Landlord or
its agent sees
judge as
partner in
labeling
tenant as
shamed
debtor,
pressuring
tenant to pay
rent or get
evicted

Attribution
dynamics
flourish in
this
atmosphere,
and conflict
escalation
might occur
rapidly.

The parties can
discuss the
inclusion of
mediation or
other conflict
resolution
processes in
their settlement
agreements,
whether
upstream or on
day-of-trial.
Make available
information
about local
mediation or
conflict
intervention
services and
rental
assistance
programs in the
courthouse and
mediation
rooms, in the
hopes that
people will
utilize them as
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a first resort in
the future.

